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SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: THEIR HOLE IN WESTERN WATER USE
I. Introduct ion
A. Importance: Special water districts [hereinafter
water districts] are among the most important type of state
polictical subdivision particularly in the West where more
than 95% of the approximately 1000 water districts are
located.1 Even though water districts only comprise about
10% of the public and private organizations which deliver
water for irrigation in the west, they distribute about 50%
of the total.2 Moreover, both the total acreage irrigated
and the total population served by special water districts
has steadily increased since 1920.3
B. Visibility: Despite their relative importance as
water management institutions, relatively little is known
about water districts except on a case by case basis for
those districts involved in public controversy or
litigation.
Systematic evaluation of district performance
is inhibited by lack of an adequate database both within
and between states, disinterest by researchers, and less
obviously, the incredible diversity of water district
functions, structures, and statutory powers.4 A number of
recent studies have begun to both further our understanding
of water districts and to suggest various reforms.5
C. Evolution:
The relative anonymity of water
district operations is quickly disappearing due to a number
of factors. Withdrawal of federal funding to support the

1 . J. Leshy, "Special Water Districts - The Historical
Background," in J. Corbridge ed. Special Water Districts:
Challenge for the Future, [hereinafter Corbridge] Boulder,
Co: U. of Colo, Natural Resources Law Center 1985,
11-30.1984
.
2 . Id. at 13.
3 . Id. at 13-14.
4 . T. De Young, "Discretion Versus Accountability: The
Case of Special Water Districts," at 34-37 in Corbridge,
supra note 1.
5 . See,
1982 Arizona State Law Journal 345-527
[hereinafter ASLJ]; Corbridge, supra note 1; B. Driver,
Water Efficiency Program Report, (Western Governors’
Association - forthcoming); C. Hobbs, The Special Districts
of California, Sacramento, CA: The Association of Calif.
Water Agencies, April 1979; Robert B. Hawkins, Self
Government by Special District, Stanford, Ca: Hoover
Institute Press, 1976; Don L. Bowen, Special District
Government in Arizona, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ. Press, 1982;
For an earlier treatment, see J. Bollens, Special District
Governments in the United States, Berkeley, CA: U. of Cal.
Press, 1957.

construction of water storage projects as well as other
water infrastructure requirements has caused considerable
concern in the west. As water districts turn to the
private bond market or to the states to raise needed funds,
the institutional and financial viability of these entities
is being subjected to close scrutiny.
Investors are likely
to raise questions about district organization and
management, their financial accountability, and their
relationship to other water entities in their geographic
area.
D.
Purpose: The purpose of this presentation is to
first review sources of discontent related to water
districts followed by an evaluation of recent trends and
proposals for reform. Special consideration is given to
improving water use efficiencies either through removing or
modifying district restrictions on water reallocation or
improving operating efficiencies witin districts.
II. Challenges to Water Management by Special District
A.
Districts as Uncooperative Members of the
Intergovernmental Community.
In a series of reports on
special districts, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations concluded that special
districts tend to create intergovernmental problems,
distort political processes, and lead to the inefficient
delivery of services through duplication of services and
problems in coordination with other units of
governments.6 These problems are especially evident in
urban areas. Traditionally, water districts served
relatively homogeneous rural constituencies. Rapid
urbanization throughout the west has contributed to a
situation where roughly 50% of all western water districts
are found within Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.7 And rural districts face challenges from thirsty
municipal and industrial users who increasingly covet water
used in agriculture.8 Water districts therefore find
themselves in a complex intergovernmental environment

6 . American Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
[hereinafter ACIR] State and Local Roles in the Federal
System, (Report A-88), Washington, DC: USGPO April, 1982;
ACIR, The Problem of Special Districts in American
Government, (Report a-22) 1964; ACIR, Striking a Better
Balance, (Report A-45), 1973; ACIR, ACIR State Legislative
Program, (Report M-94), 1975 at 114-17.
7 . BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1977
Census of Governments, No. 2, Finances of Special Districts
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.

8 . J. Folk-Williams, Susan Fry, and Lucy Hilgendorf,
Western Water Flows to the Cities, Santa Fe, NM: Western
Network, 1985.
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characterized by change and pressure.
1.
Demands for Increased Oversight: The
relatively large failure rate of early water districts led
to state regulation of district financial activities.9
Occasional abuses including fraud, embezzlement, and
misappropriation of public monies by a few water districts
over the years has contributed to fuller regulation of all
districts in a number of states.10
More recently, most
states have begun to integrate and centralize water
management and planning.11 State audit and review of
water district fiscal, hydrologic, and other transactions
consequently has increased.
B.
Districts as Undemocratic Governments. Even though
water districts are political subdivisions of the state,
they are not creatures of state government nor do they
provide the range of services commonly associated with
local government.
A review of the hodgepodge of water
district laws suggests they are strictly tailored to the
needs and desires of a narrow band of local interests. A
trend has been toward acreage based voting which tends to
concentrate control in agricultural hands and in some
areas, larger landowners.12
1. Legal challenges to water districts’
provisions for voting and participation in district affairs
have appeared.
The cases stem from the relatively common
practice of restricting voting to landowners and to a
lesser extent, weighting votes in direct proportion to
economic investment, e.g., one vote per acre.13
In Ball
v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court
generally exempted water districts from the one-person, one
vote principle.
2. Despite federal court rulings, state courts

9 . L. Benson, "Desert Survival: The Evolving Western
Irrigation District," ASLJ, supra note 5 at 397-400.
10. See Corbridge, supra note 1 at 43-44.
11. U.S. Water Resources Council, State of the States:
Water Resources Planning and Management, Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1982; Terry D. Edgmon and Tim De Young, "State
Models of Water Resources Administration," in John G.
Frances and Richard Ganzel, eds., Western Public Lands and
Natural Resources, Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, and
Co., 1985.
12 See M. Goodall, J. Sullivan, and T. De Young,
California Water: A New Political Economy, (1978); M.
Goodall and J. Sullivan, "Water System Entities in
California: Social and Environmental Effects," in
Corbridge, 51- 71.
13. See generally, T. De Young, "Governing Special
Districts: The Conflict Between Voting Rights and Property
Privileges," in ASLJ, supra note 5.
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or legislatures may reach contrary conclusions in order to
reduce the amount of political insularity traditionally
afforded to water districts.
CASE A.I.:
In New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District, for example, the state legislature
amended the district’s enabling legislation so that board
members are now elected by district landowners on a one
person, one vote basis instead of appointed by district
courts.14
CASE A.2.:
In Utah, members of the governing
boards of conservancy districts are now appointed by the
Governor from nominees submitted by affected cities and
counties as opposed to judicial appointment.15
B. Districts as Artificial Obstacles to Efficiency:
Water districts increasingly are criticized for their role
in the inefficient use of water.16 Ineffeciencies are
both internal and external to water districts.
1. Internal inefficiencies are the result of past
and present district policy decisions.
Traditionally,
water has been priced artificially low in reclamation and
analogous state programs as a form of agriculutural
subsidy. The primary vehicle for revenue generation in
water districts is taxation, not user fees.
Levy
assessments, usually related to landownership, are
generally used to repay long-term capital expenditures
whereas water tolls are used to cover the variable costs of
providing services. Water tolls tend to be low in water
districts which hold rights to water (and therefore do not
have to pay unit costs) and in districts that provide other
benefits, e.g., flood protection, not directly related to
water use. The reliance upon levy assessments allows for
costs to be distributed over the entire population giving
agricultural users a substantial subsidy.17 In
consequence, the price of water is reflective of district
financial obligations and/or political preferences rather
than the economic value of the resource.
Agricultural
subsidies both reduce the incentive to conserve water and
increase the demand for water supply projects.
In
addition, many districts do not meter water nor allow for

14. T. De Young, "Searching for the Milagro Beanfield: The
Politics of Surface Water Management in New Mexico,"
Public Service, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981) at 6.
15. Corbridge, supra note 1 at 26.
16 See D. Lee, Political Provision of Water: An
Economic/Public Choice Perspective in Corbridge 5170; B.
Gardner, "Institutional Impediments to Efficient Water
Allocation," Policy Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2: 353 65.
17 La Veen and Stavins, op. cit., at 31.
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internal transfers of water entitlements which further
impedes efficient allocation within districts.
CASE B.I.I.: New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District provides flood control and irrigation
services to an rapidly urbanizing area which includes
Albuquerque, the state’s largest city.18
The proportion
of irrigable acreage has declined from about 46 % in 1930
when the district was formed, to about 21 % in 1980. A
continuing source of controversy is the district’s levy
assessment policies.
"A" lands, irrigable parcels of one
acre or larger, are charged a fixed per acre fee
irrespective of assessed valuation or amount of water
consumed.
(No water tolls are assessed.)
"B" lands,
non-irrigated lands benefitted by district drainage and
flood control services, are assessed an ad valorem levy
that is collected by the counties in the district.
For a
number of years, the district kept ”A" land charges
extremely low so that "B" land levies provided most of the
district’s revenues.
In response to complaints in the late
1970s, the district adopted a 75/25 cost apportionment
policy for "B" and "A" lands.
Requiring further pricing
revisions has been proposed but not. adopted in each session
of the State Legislature during the 1980s.
2. External or societal inefficiencies in water
use are caused in part by water district rules, federal
reclamation law, and state water law restrictions on
transfers of waters between jurisdictions.19 Transferring
water out. of water districts is difficult due to
uncertainty about ownership,20
appurtenancy requirements
in some states where water and land rights cannot be
severed, opposition by districts where transfer of water
may impair the ability of remaining users to meet district
financial obligations, and situations where administrative
approval (district or state level) is a prerequisite for
transfers.21 More generally, water districts superimpose
a system of discretionary administrative law which impedes
the movement of water outside of their jurisdiction.
CASE B.2.1: Under Arizona law, irrigation
districts, agricultural improvement districts, and water
user associations may veto any water transfer both within
their jurisdiction and the drainage basin of operation.22

18 This case is based on my research which appears in
"Searching for the Milagro Beanfield," supra note 10.
19 See C. Meyers and D. Tarlock, Water Resource
Management, Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1979 at Chapter
ITT.
20 Corbridge, supra note 1 at. 24.
21 B. Gardner, op. cit. at 359-60.
22 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 45-172 (5); See L. Mac Donnell,

5

C.
Districts as Threats to the Environment. Districts
have been criticized for their role in creating or ignoring
environmental degradation. Environmental problems result
when a water district is singularly concerned with
providing water to irrigable lands. Traditionally, water
supply projects have modified the appearance, ecology, and
access opportunities of riparian habitats. More recently,
environmental pollution due to agricultural runoff has
emerged as a major problem in many locales. Responding to
demands for environmental protection, recreational access,
and related uses are relatively new challenges which
confront many water districts.
CASE C.I.:
In an April 1, 1986 suit, the Friends
of the Earth have charged that Glenwood Springs’ Colo.
Water Cons. District has violated Colorado’s open record
law for not allowing access to his files on endangered
species. Says Albrecht of FOE:
"These tax supported water
barons are not elected and their arrogance is beyond
belief."23
CASE C.2.: Agricultural waste water contaminated
with high levels of selenium and other toxics originating
in California’s Westlands Water District poisoned livestock
and migratory waterfowl in and near the Kesterson Wildlife
Refuge. Westlands was able to negotiate an agreement with
the Department of the Interior which allowed irrigation and
drainage discharge until June 30, 1986. This case may have
political and financial implications for water districts
throughout the West.
III. Understanding Special Districts: Prerequisite to
Reform
A.
Water Districts Are Public Organizations. Unlike
private entities, public organizations are characterized by
their tendency to pursue complex, multiple objectives.
Moreover, they may pursue intangible and inherently
conflictual goals.24
1. Security and control over water resources

C. Howe, J. Corbridge, and W. Ahrens, "Guidelines for
Developing Area-of-Origin Compensation," (Ft. Collins:
Colorado Water Resources Research Institute) forthcoming al
8-9.
23 See Ed Marston, "FOE takes the 'Water Boys’ to Court,"
High Country News, April 14, 1986 at 6.
24 See H. Ranney, R. Backoff, and C. Levine, "Comparing
Public and Private Organizations," in J. Perry and K.
Kraemer (eds.) Public Management and Private Perspectives,
Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1983 at 96-7.
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tends to take precedence over efficiency for local water
management institutions.25
2. Water districts generally have the ability to
withstand challenges to their discretionary authority and
to coerce and monopolize water policy within their
jurisdictions.
But at the same time, water districts are
more subject to public scrutiny that their private
counterparts.
B.
Water Districts Do Hot Promote Irrational
Policies. Water districts increasingly are criticized for
inefficient use of water.
A common critique proceeds as
follows: efficient use is technically possible, would save
money, and is therefore the "rational" course of action in
an environment of increasing demands and finite supplies.
Condoning inefficient use -the wont of water districts- is
therefore irrational. But such analysis commits an
ecological fallacy; the assumption is made that what is
rational from a societal level of aggregation is also
rational at the district level.
1. In practice, the evaluation of costs and
benefits arc generally confined to the geographic
boundaries of political jurisdictions.26 In his
discussion of agricultural subsidies available to water
districts, Lee observes:
Once people have committed their wealth to decisions
that make sense from a private perspective, only
because of private policy, they would suffer a private
loss if the policy were to be eliminated."272
8
Suggestions for reform are varied but usually include
changing district pricing policies. Charging a competitive
price for water may be opposed by influential political
constituencies in the district who help determine policy by
service on the district’s board of directors. Water
district leadership therefore is reluctant to remove
subsidies which would increase costs to district

25 See F.L. Brown and H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the
Southwest, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ Press forthcoming at 252.
26 See MacDonnell, op. cit., at 49 50.
27 Corbridge at 62.
2 8 . See D. Mann, "Institutional Framework for Agricultural
Water Conservation and Reallocation in the West: A Policy
Analysis," in Western Water Institutions in a Changing
West, Napa, Ca.: John Muir Inst., Vol. 2, 1980, at 45; E.
P. LaVeen and R.N. Stavins, "Institutional Impeidments for
More Efficient Use and Allocation Irrigation Water in the
West," Report, Berkeley, Ca.: The Rural America Task Force,
The Ford Foundation, September, 1981 at 28-32.
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members.28

C. Water Districts Are Litigious.
1. Following from the above, differences in the
level at which costs and benefits are calculated frequently
lead to conflicts among jurisdictions over the desirability
of various actions or projects.
2. From the perspective of the public choice
theorist, a predictable consequence of the underpricing of
water and restrictions on free trade in water rights is the
removal of price as a mechanism for resource allocation.
Litigation is used as an alternative means of reallocating
water.2
29
8
7
6
2
5
3.
Litigation may be preferred as a political
strategy by private interests who are able to use water
districts as mechanisms for distributing costs throughout
the jurisdiction.
D.
Water Districts Are Vulnerable. Reliance on a
single resource, water, makes many water districts
vulnerable to extremes in weather as well as more subtle
factors accociated with demographic changes.
III. The Political Feasibility of Suggested Reforms: A
Selected Review
A.
Types of Solutions. Water district reform
proposals range from abolition and privatization at one
extreme to the centralization and integration of water
district discretionary authority into a regional or state
water management system at the other. Somewhere in the
middle are proposals for pricing reform, changes in laws
affecting districts, and exploration of cooperative
endeavors.

25 See F.L. Brown and H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the
Southwest, Tucson, AZ: U. of AZ Press forthcoming at 252.
26 See MacDonnell, op. cit., at 49-50.
27 Corbridge at 62.
2 8 . See D. Mann, "Institutional Framework for Agricultural
Water Conservation and Reallocation in the West: A Policy
Analysis," in Western Water Institutions in a Changing
West, Napa, Ca.: John Muir Inst., Vol. 2, 1980, at 45; E.
P. LaVeen and R.N. Stavins, "Institutional Tmpeidments for
More Efficient Use and Allocation Irrigation Water in the
West," Report, Berkeley, Ca.: The Rural America Task Force,
The Ford Foundation, September, 1981 at 28-32.
29 Corbridge at 59.
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1. Given the independence of water districts, i.e.
rational, litigious, autonomous public organizations,
radical transformation of current practices is unlikely.
2. Given the vulnerability of water districts to
resource constraints and to a lesser extent, public
scrutiny, significant reform has occurred in some locales,
largely in response to external threats or water crises.30
B. Regulatory Reform.
States have regulated district
activities in an inconsistent fashion.
For example, even
though water districts are required to report fiscal
transactions and other data to various state agencies,
reporting requirements generally are not enforced.
Moreover, comprehensive databases which would enable the
identification of particularly inefficient or otherwise
wasteful districts do not exist in most states.
Stricter
enforcement of existing statutes and compilation of
comprehensive databases on water districts is a proposal
designed as a necessary step toward efficient and equitable
regulation.
Another possible solution is to require public
service commission regulation of all special districts who
charge for services.
1. Evaluation:
Significant regulatory reform is
unlikely due to lack of enforcement in some states,
considerable financial costs, and political opposition from
water districts particularly from smaller districts that
tend to be least able to expend time and resources on
reporting requirements.
C. Organizational Reform.
Relatively few states with
significant numbers of special districts have consolidated
or merged districts
into regional management authorities
but there are a few precedents.31 More successful are
local agency format ion commissions which have controlled
the proliferation of special districts in some states.32
1. Evaluation:
Local agency formation
commissions only affect proposed districts whereas
organizational reform of existing units of government
entails significant transaction costs and is likely to be
unsuccessful.

30 Arizona’s 1980 Groundwater Management Act is a case in
point.
See Michael F. McNulty and Gary C. Woodard,
"Arizona Water Issues: Contrasting Economic and Legal
Perspectives," Arizona Review, Fall, 1984.
31 With regard to the latter, see Edgmon and De Young, op.
cit., for a discussion of regional reforms in Florida and
Nebraska.
32 See Corbridge at 37 39; ACIR, State and Local Roles in
the Federal System, (Report A-88), at 375-81.
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D.
Voluntary, Cooperative Endeavors. Cooperative
agreements between districts and other units of government
have a long and varied tradition for water districts. Many
water districts contract with state and federal resource
agencies for water supplies, operations and maintenance
assistance, and other water related functions. Recent
proposals explore the possibilities of sharing and or
purchasing water district water resources through
cooperative agreements.
1. Evaluation. Voluntary transactions between
water districts who control water and organizations who are
willing to pay for the use of surplus supplies or even the
temporary use of permanent supplies33 offers the best,
short-term solution to increasing demands for finite
resources.
Such solutions are limited by the amount of
available surplus water or "trade" situations as well as by
the extent to which negative externalities generate
opposition from third parties.

33 A recent agreement between the New Mexico Department
of Fish and Game and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District is a case in point.
The district has agreed to
let the Fish and Game Department "use" water in a portion
of the district’s canal system for the development of a
trout fishery.
Logs, rocks, and other impediments will be
installed to create pools along the canal.
It appears to
be a Pareto solution because the district does not lose any
water and the Fish and Game Department gains a new
recreational facility literally at the edge of Albuquerque.
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